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AIR DISASTERS:
THE CASE FOR RATIONALIZATION
JoHN V. ALLEN*
THE NEED to rationalize the legal and financial consequences
of a major air disaster is becoming increasingly evident. Be-
cause of the involvement of many different, and sometimes con-
flicting interests, the object of any attempted rationalization must
be to achieve some kind of compromise or common denominator,
to combine or coalesce the interests of the different parties con-
cerned, on the basis of the broadest possible consensus. Apart from
the obvious interest of the flying public, there are four other con-
cerned elements-airline operators, airline manufacturers, insur-
ance underwriters and governments. The following proposal for
rationalization of the legal and financial consequences following
major air disasters is presented with the hope that as aviation safety
increases, the need for such a theory will decline.
The objectives of any compensation formula, whether interna-
tional or national, are to provide: (1) adequate, certain and prompt
compensation for all accident victims; and (2) fair distribution of
the costs of compensation among all parties concerned, including
(i) operators and carriers; (ii) all manufacturers, from prime
* The writer is a Solicitor and Senior Partner in a law firm in London, Eng-
land, which has been concerned with aviation business from the earliest days of
flying. He served as Legal Adviser for many years to the British airworthiness
organization known as the Air Registration Board before this became integrated
in 1972 into the British Civil Aviation Authority. Currently, he is Legal Adviser
to the Society of British Aerospace Companies (the representative body of the
British aerospace manufacturing industry) in the United Kingdom, and is also
Chairman of a Products Liability Working Group of the European Association
of National Aerospace Manufacturing Industries known as AECMA (Association
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he stresses that this article represents his own personal views, for which no one
else is responsible. Mr. Allen's article was completed December 31, 1976.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
contractors to tire-setters; (iii) insurance underwriters; and (iv)
government organizations concerned with potential responsibility
for accidents. A major consideration regarding both objectives is
whether existing differences should be retained between interna-
tional and non-international flights and whether the difference
between the liability positions of manufacturers and operators
should be retained.
The breadth of the problem is more clearly understood when
one considers the following hypothetical fact situation. Citizens
of a half dozen countries board an airline owned by a carrier
from a seventh country and manufactured by a party from an
eighth country, with a hundred or so manufacturing participants
from still other countries. The plane is scheduled to fly between
a ninth and tenth country. It is not surprising that under such cir-
cumstances, a legal imbroglio results in the event the plane crashes.
Despite the fact that the passengers are identical as far as age,
earning power, family dependency, and all other relevant factors,
under different systems of law, each may have an entirely different
entitlement. Recovery for some victims will be on the basis of one
or another of a whole series of different applicable Convention
bases, dependent upon such considerations as where the ticket
was purchased, while in other cases, recovery will be founded upon
non-Convention bases. The non-Convention bases may include
damage actions by victims against operators, manufacturers, and
appropriate governmental regulatory bodies, as well as subrogation
claims by airline carriers against manufacturers or their under-
writers. Numerous legal systems and the resolution of conflict be-
tween them will be involved. Artificial factors, such as punitive
damages and contingent attorneys fees, will determine the amount
of compensation recoverable by victims. Equivalent victims may
be compensated unequally. It could fairly be called a lottery,
even a form of Russian roulette.
It has been assumed that an improved solution would be pre-
ferred, although doubtless some may prefer the present confusion
and uncertainty which arguably provide more scope for negotiating
better compensation. This article advocates taking the problem
to pieces and putting them back together to make an improved
structure. In order to do so, the following steps need to be taken:
(1) A determination of what constitutes the most acceptable form-
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ula for the "best," in the sense of the most just, solution concerning
the compensation applicable to passenger victims and the respon-
sibilities of other parties for providing this compensation. A sep-
arate consideration may be required for the elements already
referred to-operators, manufacturers, insurance underwriters, and
governments.
(2) A determination of how this formula can be funded. In await-
ing formulation of an ultimate or long term solution, interim or
pragmatic solutions may be required. Obviously, it is no comfort to
a disabled plaintiff or to the survivors of an air disaster victim to
enjoy an open and shut case with the judgment measured in the
millions of dollars if the defendant manufacturer or operator is
bankrupt.
(3) An examination of the basic legal elements, including (i) li-
ability (fault or no-fault); (ii) quantum of compensation; and
(iii) applicable legal systems or conflict of laws.
What is the "best" formulary compensation? Should a passenger
be entitled to any compensation at all? How should it be measured?
Should it be limited? If so, to what amount or on what basis?
Should compensation be awarded in the case of unavoidable ac-
cident? Arguably there is no logic behind leaving victims of un-
avoidable accidents unrequited, while victims of accidents due
to pilot error or mechanical failure are compensated. These ques-
tions must be considered and rationalized before reaching any
decisions regarding who should bear the risk of such loss.
Thus, one should consider whether some compensation at some
level should be payable to all victims, regardless of blame or cir-
cumstances; secondly, whether in certain cases additional com-
pensation should be paid, whether unlimited or fixed, and if the
latter, on what basis. It would seem logical to suggest that a pas-
senger victim should have only one claim rather than separate
claims against manufacturers and carriers. Such an approach would
construct one liability facing one entitlement. The one claim could
be divided into two parts, the lower level providing basic limited
compensation, fixed and standard everywhere and automatically
applicable to all passengers. The second level would be recover-
able on a compensatory basis governed by the law of the passenger's
own country.
Although the question of compensatory damages in addition
1977)
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
to the automatic recovery is admittedly a difficult one, the logical
recommendation is that the compensatory recovery be determined
by the law of the country which determines the passenger's personal
living standards. For instance, if a passenger is struck by a taxi at
the airport in his own country, his scale of compensation is fixed by
its national laws. Should he be entitled to recover on some higher
scale while traveling in an aircraft a few miles away? It is patently
illogical. The illogicality recently has been demonstrated by the
Paris air crash case.
It is natural that a claimant will go to the forum where the
compensation is higher, if the higher scale of compensation can
be made to apply to him. Thus, a laborer from Somalia in Africa,
working for British contractors in the Persian Gulf and there suf-
fering a worker's accident, will prefer to recover damages or com-
pensation in the courts of London, on a scale far higher than
would be applied to him in the Persian Gulf or Somalia. While
the claimant must be expected to go where he can best succeed,
the system, which permits him to do better in the courts of a foreign
country than in the courts of his own country, is plainly wrong, or
at best illogical. Higher damages are awarded in other countries
because of a higher standard of living, and damages on a higher
scale should not apply to claimants concerned with living on a
lower scale.
The position would be open-ended if the compensatory level
had no limit. In the context of the air disaster, it is felt that, in
the general interest, punitive damages should be impermissible
and the compensatory level limited. Such limitation could be es-
tablished, for instance, in accordance with the $300,000 limit
proposed by the Guatemala Supplemental Compensation Plan now
before the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in Washington. The
limit could be even higher, but there must be a finite amount, above
which there can be no recovery. This layer of finite compensatory
damages always will be subject to proof of loss. If an individual
case requires further provision, resort can be had to the personal
accident insurance market. Under this formulation, any accident
victim can recover (i) his first layer of absolute compensation; (ii)
compensation on proof of loss on top of (i); and (iii) to the extent
required, any personal accident insurance on top of (ii).
The obvious forum for the international regulation of air disas-
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ters is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the
aviation arm of the United Nations. There are over 120 member-
states, all with at least one national airline which is in many if
not most cases owned and operated by a State corporation. Of
those countries, however, only about twenty have a manufacturing
industry, whether established or currently developing. While this
means that manufacturing nations are outnumbered in the United
Nations, it does not mean to say that a solution achieving justice
between manufacturers and operators is impossible, only that a
necessarily long time might be required to accomplish the goal.
In the long term, an ICAO Convention would be the most ap-
propriate procedure for total regulation of the financial conse-
quences of air disasters. This regulation could not be achieved for
many years, however, making an interim solution essential. One
possible interim solution is that the major commercial aviation
nations of the world evolve, on a country-by-country basis, an
equivalent solution, subject only to differing national legal or pro-
cedural requirements. In this situation, one country will have to
take the lead. The most influential candidate would be the United
States. What, then, is the present position in the United States con-
cerning the financial consequences of air disasters? Such a question
cannot be answered briefly, but examination of certain pending
activities in the field will be helpful.
Different conventions, ranging from the Warsaw Convention up
to the Guatemala Protocol of 1971, apply to international flights.
These international conventions are challenged by the American
plaintiffs' bar as contrary to the United States Constitution on the
ground that they restrict the free right to appropriate compensation.
The Guatemala Convention has not been introduced yet in the
United States, and until it is, it cannot be introduced elsewhere.
It has been the policy of the American government not to introduce
the Guatemala Convention without the Supplemental Compensa-
tion Plan (SCP) which implements the Interagency Group on
International Aviation contract to that effect. The SCP provides
for compensation up to $200,000 on top of the Guatemala $100,-
000, making a top level of $300,000, subject to the recent "gold"
upward adjustments. The SCP has been submitted to the CAB
in Washington for approval as an inter-airline agreement within
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Written representations have
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been submitted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and interested government departments in favor of the SCP, while
the plaintiffs' bar opposes the proposal. The CAB may convene
"public interest" hearings before reaching a conclusion. If the SCP
is not approved by the CAB, the whole position remains at large,
leaving much room for reassessment. If the SCP ultimately is ap-
proved by the CAB, the United States may introduce Guatemala
plus SCP for international flights. Other countries may follow
Guatemala then, and, if desired, introduce their own SCP.
The above outlined program would fit into the previously con-
ceived formula in the following manner: (i) automatic compen-
sation up to $100,000 plus (ii) compensatory damages or com-
pensation up to an additional $200,000 on top of (i), provided
it is proved that legal compensation as evaluated by the courts
would exceed the underlying $100,000, and (iii) personal acci-
dent insurance, if required, on top of (ii). It would be much
easier at top levels for personal accident insurance to be obtained
than liability insurance. Alternatively, the operators' and manu-
facturers' liability insurance market can be supported by additional
compensation coming from the personal accident insurance market.
Another pending American development is the Magnuson Bill
(S. 2992, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.). The bill relates to domestic or
non-international traffic and provides an excellent solution, which
complies with all relevant criteria already outlined, but which
exacerbates the illogical disparity between international and non-
international procedures. For example, manufacturers face un-
limited exposure at home and abroad. Carriers, on the other hand,
face limited liabilities abroad under any one of several international
conventions, while liability remains unlimited at home. The Mag-
nuson Bill provides that operators, manufacturers, government de-
partments, and all others facing possible public liability constitute
one single liability, and one compensation entitlement for the pas-
senger victim will be allowed. This compensation would be pro-
vided at shared cost among the parties concerned, by insurance up
to the available market level and above that by government indem-
nification recoverable by ticket surcharge. However the financial
consequences may be arranged, recoupment costs will affect the
fare structure. Liability costs and increased insurance premiums of
manufacturers will be reflected in the cost of aircraft and equip-
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ment sold to operators and passed on to the flying public in the
form of increased ticket prices.
Regarding the high-risk exposure applicable to operators, in non-
international traffic, and to manufacturers, in all cases, it seems
undesirable and unfair to impose open-ended exposure without
fault. The difficulty of determining fault liability in the case of air
accidents, however, is recognized. The fair solution would appear
to be an intermediate course of reversing the burden of proof unless
the manufacturer or operator concerned can discharge the burden
of proof by showing that the accident occurred without fault. For
instance, no matter how reliable aircraft equipment may be, it is
impossible to rule out the prospect of a failure due to some hitherto
unknown metallurgical phenomenon, the cause of the accident
ascertained in post-accident investigations constituting new knowl-
edge. It seems patently unfair to blame a manufacturer or operator
for not possessing and applying knowledge which he did not and
could not have had at the material time. The state of the art should
become an effective defense, subject to proof positive by the de-
fending manufacturer.
Consumerism is becoming a powerful force in the social con-
science of the modem world. Although much can be said in its
favor, consumerism should not be taken too far by applying strict
liability without fault beyond any reasonable pecuniary amount.
Aviation, by reason of its special features of internationalism and
high-risk exposure, should be controlled by a special regime, as
is nuclear energy under the United States' Price-Anderson legisla-
tion and Europe's variety of international treaties under the sur-
veillance of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment. In Europe, the European Economic Community has re-
cently produced the third draft of a proposed directive imposing,
with many qualifications, strict liability as part of product liability.
A limit of thirty million dollars has been suggested. The directive,
however, is far from completion and unlikely to emerge, if at all,
without substantial modification.
In considering manufacturers' legal liabilities, the ultimate de-
terrent to taking consumerism too far is consideration of the addi-
tional element previously mentioned-the manufacturers' ability to
respond in damages. It is without meaning to impose liabilities with-
out ensuring they can be satisfied. That apart, the prospect of
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manufacturing bankruptcies, which would create unemployment or
at least reduce investment in research and development, can only
be regarded as wholly against the public interest.
As regards the role of government, governments do not respond
as an act of charity, but because of the obvious responsibilities of
governments generated by their conscious decision to establish and
maintain a national air transport undertaking in their respective
countries. The responsibilities include such matters as air traffic
control, approval of manufacturers, minimum standards, airport
control, meteorological or weather reports, and many other aspects
coming within the purview of bodies like the FAA and CAB in the
United States and the Civil Aviation Authority in the United King-
dom. In the United Kingdom and Europe, national industries have
invited governments to participate in a joint examination of the
problems of air transport. Under consideration is the issue of
whether a formula akin to that proposed by the Magnuson Bill in
the United States Congress should be adopted to afford indemnifi-
cation on terms to be negotiated. Whatever these terms might be-
come, in the end any cost will fall on the passenger ticket, thus
emanating from government to industry and operators to passengers.
To summarize, possible current objections to the present system
may include (i) objections by airline operators to open-ended ex-
posure for internal flights compared with limited exposure inter-
nationally and to exposure to a mass of differing conventions; (ii)
objections by manufacturers to open-ended liabilities, international
or non-international; (iii) objections by governments to the un-
certainty of their position regarding the causative aspects of air
traffic control, certification, and the role of their aviation regula-
tory bodies, as well as questions concerning the scope of govern-
ments' overriding role in the international aviation business; and
(iv) objections by the insurance market as to whether insurers
should accept centralized liabilities, eliminating subrogation not
only from operators to manufacturers, but also from manufacturers
to sub-contractors and suppliers.
A comprehensive and general solution is advocated in the gen-
eral interests of the community, on this basis: (1) the abolition of
the artificial distinction between international and non-international
traffic; (2) the abolition of the outmoded Warsaw Convention and
its successors up to the Guatemala Protocol and its derivative SCP;
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(3) provisions for all accident victims to receive adequate, certain,
and prompt compensation comprised of
(A) automatic compensation without any need to differentiate be-
tween operators and manufacturers and without any need to con-
sider strict or fault liability. This can be 100 units which could be
$100,000, or any other sum to be determined by the ICAO on a
year-by-year basis in advance; and, if appropriate
(B) additional compensation such as the proposed SCP, subject to
proof of loss up to, for example, twice the amount of that allowed
by subsection (A), which would be, as per the proposed SCP,
$200,000 in excess of $100,000, making a possible total of
$300,000. For consideration is whether this should be without
proof of liability on the part of anyone, or subject to the reverse
burden of proof, i.e., a prima facie liability; and, if further appropri-
ate
(C) excess personal accident coverage beyond the amounts re-
covered in subsections (A) and (B) in any case where such cover-
age is bought with the ticket and up to whatever amount the per-
sonal accident insurance will stand and is required;
(4) allocation of the cost of subsections (A) and (B) of section
(3) above to an aviation accident fund, whether an international
ICAO fund or a national government fund, which would be insured
up to an insurance level fixed by each government with its insur-
ance market by agreement, or failing agreement, by government
determination, and by government indemnification above that level;
and (5) subscription to the fund by the partners in the enterprise,
including, in any country, the government, all interested and reg-
istered operators, and all manufacturers and manufacturing par-
ticipants. This is the entire cost. The shares would be negotiated in
the sense that operators would subscribe X%, manufacturers would
subscribe Y%, and government would ascribe or accept Z%,
with X% plus Y% plus Z% equalling 100%. X% shared by
operators would be collected on some basic pro rata turnover from
all registered operators of the country concerned. Likewise, Y%
would be collected from subscriptions from all manufacturing par-
ticipants, whether in negotiating contract prices or otherwise.
A solution based on the foregoing proposal would best be intro-
duced through the ICAO. Nevertheless, because of the delay this
approach inevitably would involve, the solution might be intro-
duced more effectively on a country-by-country basis, at least
1977]
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throughout the leading commercial aviation nations of the world.
There are doubtless many snags and unforeseen difficulties awaiting
any solution, but they surely cannot approach the present hodge-
podge. It is my belief that Europeans would welcome a start along
these lines in the United States.
